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I. INTRODUCTION
In examining significant trends in American trust law,
several observations are worth mentioning at the outset. First,
trust law in the United States is primarily a matter of state law;
thus, the trends discussed below may appear in some states but

* Professor Emeritus, School of Law, University of California at Berkeley. The
author is the reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, was co-reporter for
the Uniform Probate Code, and currently serves in an advisory role for the
Uniform Trust Act and Restatement (Third) of Property.
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not in others.' Second, procedural merger of law and equity in
this country has been substantially accomplished in nearly all
states, but this should not be understood as eliminating the
importance of equitable doctrine and remedies. Third, without
abandoning the basic definition of a trust as a fiduciary
relationship, 2 there appear to be subtle but practically significant
departures
from the traditional concept that a trust is not an
"entity."3 Certainly, the tax law has long treated the typical trust
as an entity separate from the trustee. 4 In addition, an increasing
number of states draw a distinction for various purposes between
the trustee personally and the trustee's fiduciary or
"representative" capacity. 5

1.
The promulgation of a "uniform ace by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws merely recommends the act to the various
states; the act must then be enacted by the legislatures of individual states in
order to become law in those jurisdictions.
2.
This continues to be a fundamental aspect of attempts to define the
trust concept.

For example, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS section 2 simply

restates the oft-quoted definition of prior Restatements: "[A] trust . . . is a
fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising as a result of a
manifestation of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person
who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of charity or
for one or more persons, at least one of whom is not the sole trustee."
3.
Courts continue to deny in dictum that trusts are legal entities, as in
the recent McBee v. Vandecnocke Revocable Trust, No. WD 54506, 1998 WL
201743 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1998), although the holding that the trustee was an
indispensable party to a third party's action could just as well have applied to the
trustee in a representative capacity. For a thoroughly sensible recent decision
made difficult by this traditional notion, see Ziegler v. Nickel, 64 Cal. App. 4th 545
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
4.
I.R.C. (Subchapter J) §§ 641-79 (West 1994).
5.
These purposes range from: (1) the awkward traditional view that a
trustee's note to the trust cannot be trust property (after all, one cannot be
indebted to oneselfl), on which RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS section 87 is
superseded not only by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS section 2 cmt. i, and 40

cmt. b, but also by widespread, accepted practice (see Reporter's Notes to
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. i); to (2) the traditional view that trustees can

neither sue nor be sued in their fiduciary capacity; when successful, a third
party's suit results in a judgment against the trustee personally, with the trustee
to seek reimbursement from the trust estate. It is expected that RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) will reverse the position of the prior RESTATEMENTS OF TRUSTS (sections

261-65) by providing that third parties' suits against trustees normally result in a
judgment against the trustee in a representativecapacity (i.e., "against the trust).
Beginning in 1969, the shift in this direction was significantly stimulated by UNIF.
PROB. CODE section 7-306 (amended 1993). See also, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§
18000-18003 (West 1991), GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-199(b) (1993); MASS. GEN. LAws

ANN. ch. 203, § 14A (West 1997). See more generally on trusts as entities,
Tatarian v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 672 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)
(although the "entity" in a prior case "was a corporation rather than a trust, the
court was not "persuade(d) . . . that a different analysis should therefore apply");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS section 2 cmt. a, and Reporter's Notes thereto; and
Jeffrey Schoenblum, The Hague Convention on Trusts: Much Ado About Very Little,
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Property owners in the United States and elsewhere are
generally living longer, often into longer periods of diminished
physical or mental health. In addition, it is generally accepted
that today broader segments of society than in the past are using
trusts, and with a greater diversity of objectives, 6 but increasingly
without the aid of legal counsel who are highly skilled in estate
planning and trust practice. 7 Perhaps these factors are playing
some role in the "user friendly" responses below, making the
trust law more sympathetic to the results of error or oversight
and more sensitive to the broad variety of trusts, trusteeships,
settlor objectives, and beneficiary circumstances.
Part II of this Article will describe substantive trust law in the
United States, in particular the creation, interpretation, and
reformation of trusts, as well as trust termination and
modification. Revocable inter vivos trusts, spendthrift trusts, and
related topics will also be addressed.
Part III will discuss
fiduciary standards, focusing on the duties of the trustee and the
rights of beneficiaries.

II. SUBSTANTIVE TRusT LAW
A. Creationof Trusts
The new and developing Restatementss of Property and Trusts
(Property Third and Trusts Third), the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC), and early but distinct trends in other statutory and
common law authorities are moving American law in the direction
of upholding property owners' attempts to establish trusts in

3 INTLTR. & CORP. PLAN. 5, 14 (1994) ("The Convention... requires recognition of
the trust as a distinct legal entity ....
Article 11 sets forth certain attributes of
the trust that must be recognized. These essentially pertain to the distinction
between the trustee acting as a fiduciary and the trustee acting in his individual
capacity.").
6.
These objectives range from tax and probate avoidance, highly
sophisticated plans of disposition, to property management late in life.
7.
See Joel Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the
New Millennium, or, We Don't Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV.
543 (1998).

8.

Restatements are produced under the auspices and with the approval

of the American Law Institute (ALI) and purport to state a proper or recommended
view of current American common law. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
tentative draft no. 2, 1999, containing sections 26 through 60, was approved in

May 1999, and tentative draft no. 1, 1996, containing sections 1 through 25, was
The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (Wills & Other

approved in May 1996.

Donative Transfers) was published in 1999 (sections 1 through 5.5 were approved
in 1998, and all sections with higher section numbers were approved in May
1995).
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situations in which traditional law would have found a transfer
defective or an expression of trust intent deficient on some
technical or formal ground. This tendency exists whether the
transfer is made during life or at death, as long as there is
evidentiary and circumstantial security that the trust represents
the settlor's properly considered, final intention. Moreover, this
trend is evident in various other areas: in legislative or judicial
acceptance of some form of "harmless error," "substantial
compliance," or "dispensing power" doctrine; 9 in increased
tolerance of certain failures to satisfy the Statute of Frauds' 0 or
the requirements for a completed inter vivos transfer;" and in
increasingly sympathetic views of attempts to create "semi-secret"
12
testamentary trusts.
American law is finally beginning to clarify and refine rules
concerning capacity to create, amend, and revoke inter vivos
trusts, recognizing that the degree of capacity to create a
revocable trust should be no higher than that to execute a will.' 3
The creation of an irrevocable inter vivos trust should depend on

whether the trust is purely donative, in which case a gift
standard is appropriate, 14 or whether it is part of a negotiated or
adversary transaction, for which the higher contract standard
would be appropriate. I
Similarly, state law throughout the country is beginning to
come to grips with issues concerning the creation, amendment,
and revocation of trusts on behalf of incapacitated persons by
their personal fiduciaries. Examples include agents acting under
express provisions of durable powers of attorney and
conservators exercising substituted judgment with court

9.
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503; Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339
(N.J. 1991); Faith v. Singleton, 692 S.W.2d 239 (Ark. 1985). Cf. Hickox v. Wilson,
496 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. 1998). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.3 (1999); John Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errorin Execution of
Wills: A Report on Australia's TranquilRevolution in ProbateLaw, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1(1987).
10.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 24.

11.

See id. § 16; see also Vasquez v. Vasquez, 973 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Ct.

App. 1998).
12.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 18 cmt. c. American law on both
"secret" (id. § 18 cmt. b) and semi-secret trusts draws no distinction between a
trust intention that is communicated inter vivos before and one communicated
after the execution of the testator's will.
13.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11(2) cmt. b (quoted with approval

in Estate of Aronoff, 177 n.6, 653 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 n.6 (Surr. Ct. 1996)).
14.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11(3) cmt. c (unl standard plus

"ability to understand the effects the disposition may have on the future financial
security" of the settlor and her dependents).
15.
See id. (referring to the standard of capacity in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 12).
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approval. The tendency here, subject to proper safeguards, is to
avoid wholly denying incapacitated persons and their families the
benefits of updated estate plans and the ability to adapt to
changed legal, financial, and family circumstances. 16
B. Interpretation,Reformation, and Policy Limitations
Analogous trends are discernible in a tendency to lessen
traditional obstacles to discovering and carrying out the specific
intentions or general objectives of settlors. Evolving doctrine,
however, continues to seek reasonable evidentiary reliability in
these matters while also insisting that purposes be lawful and
within the acceptable limits of dead hand control.
Policy limits on the dead hand begin with the rules regulating
perpetuities, the unnecessarily destructive features of which have
been removed or at least greatly curtailed in nearly all states in
the last several decades. More recent and extreme-and of
dubious policy merit-are statutes in several states abolishing
the rule against perpetuities as part of an effort to attract trust
business from elsewhere by enhancing certain tax-motivated
arrangements.' 7 Perhaps moving in an understandably more
restrictive direction is the inevitably more subjective body of
doctrine concerning trust provisions that may be contrary to
public policy on grounds other than duration. A lengthy Trusts
Third section' s has just received ALI approval. It is designed to
clarify, with the general effect of limiting, the extent to which
settlors may subject interests of trust beneficiaries to conditions

that tend seriously to intrude upon significant personal decisions
and the private lives of beneficiaries and their families. These
rules, however, would also recognize a court's equitable
discretion in appropriate cases to reform objectionable provisions
19
to accommodate reasonable concerns a settlor may have.
Subject to such policy limits, the trend of current
Restatements, the UPC, and other recent legislative and common
law authorities is to lower the barriers to admission of extrinsic
evidence and to grant more flexible remedies as needed to give

16.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11(5) cmts. e, f (on preserving,
perfecting, or altering an existing estate plan, including one established by
operation of law). For a recent case considering and discussing substituted
judgment, see Estate ofBerry, 972 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
17.
See, e.g., Douglas Blattmachr & Richard Hompesch II, Alaska v.
Delaware,Heavyweight Competitionin New Trust Laws, 12 PROB. & PRoP. 32 (1998)
(allowing unlimited life for trusts that are exempt under the generation skipping
transfer tax); see infra text accompanying notes 71-72 (noting the asset protection
aspect of these statutes$.
18.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(b) cmts. d-h.
19.
See id. § 29 cmt. e.
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effect to settlor intentions. For example, in addition to the
traditional use of extrinsic evidence to clarify ambiguities,
Property Third leads the way in allowing reformation of
unambiguous instruments 20 to cure scriveners' errors and other
mistakes that are shown by clear and convincing evidence. 21

Courts are also becoming more willing to supply gifts by
22
implication in the trust context.

C. Non-CharitablePurposes;Absence of Definite Beneficiaries
Both Trusts Third and a modest trend in caselaw and
legislation show a growing willingness to give some effect to
traditionally invalid attempts to create trusts for indefinite classes
of beneficiaries or for specific or trustee-selected non-charitable
purposes. Although recognizing dead hand policy limitations and
practical enforcement concerns, trust law has thus begun to
reject the notion that "because we can't force you to do it, we
can't allow you to do it."23 Under Trusts Third, intended trusts, or
mandatory provisions of trusts, that cannot be enforced as such
may be allowed as "adapted trusts."2 4 That is, the intended

purpose may be carried out within reasonable time limits, if the
devisee or legatee will exercise a generally personal, nonmandatory "power," to appoint or expend funds that are

otherwise held in trust for distribution in default of appointment
to beneficiaries

implied by law-that is,

for the testator's

successors in interest or for the other beneficiaries of the trust.2 5

20.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12. 1; see
also UNIF. TR.Acr§§ 411,412(b).
21.
A much noted earlier case of this type is Engle v. Siegel, 377 A.2d 892

(N.J. 1977). See also Estdte of Robinson, 720 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1998). Cf. Erickson
v. Erickson, 716 A.2d 92 (Conn. 1998); Ike v. Doolittle, 61 Cal. App. 4th 51 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998). Mistakes are increasingly being held correctible in tax contexts, as
in Griffin v. Griffin, 832 P.2d 810 (Okla. 1992), and Simches v. Simches, 671

N.E.2d 1226 (Mass. 1996), the latter of which is only one among several recent
Massachusetts cases. Even the I.R.S. recognizes that unambiguous trusts may
properly be reformed in some states to correct a drafter's error. See Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9805025 (Nov. 3, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9743033 (July 25, 1997).

22.
See, e.g., Matter of Bieley, 695 N.E.2d 1119 (N.Y. 1998).
23.
This seems a fair paraphrase of the "statement" that Morice v. Bishop of
Durham, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (Ch. 1805), made to the willing legatee in that
influential classic.
24.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 40-47.

25.
The adapted trust for reversionary beneficiaries, subject to the
trustee's power of distribution, avoids the complete failure of the decedent's
purpose under traditional doctrine, which has required the devisee to hold
immediately on the resulting trust. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, with
Leach v. Hyatt 423 S.E.2d 165 (Va. 1992), and modem English decisions, such as
the apparent change of course in McPhail v. Doulton, [19711 App. Cas. 422, [1970]
2 All E.R. 228, and Re Baden'sDeed Trusts (No. 2), [1972] 2 All E.R. 1304.
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Examples include intended trusts for "friends and relatives" to be
selected by the intended trustee, 2 6 intended trusts for "such
benevolent, charitable or non-charitable, purposes as T may
select," 2 7 and the so-called "honorary trusts" for pets,
monuments, and other more-or-less worthy, non-capricious
28
purposes that fall short of charity.
D. Revocable Inter Vivos Trusts
Earlier concerns and uncertainties about the permissibility
and role of revocable living trusts have been gradually resolved
over the last half-century or are currently being rapidly resolved
in nearly all of the states.
With solid and consistent support in statutes and caselaw,
the Trusts Third section on the "Validity and Effect of Revocable
29
Inter Vivos Trusts" states:
[A] trust that is created by the settlor's declaration of trust, by his
or her inter vivos transfer to another, or by beneficiary designation
or other payment under a life insurance policy, employee benefit or
retirement arrangement, or other contract is not rendered
testamentary merely because the settlor retains extensive rights
such as a beneficial interest for life, powers to revoke and modify
the trust, and the right to serve as or control the trustee, or
because the trust is funded in whole or in part or comes into
existence at or after the death of the settlor, or because the trust is
s O
intended to serve as a substitute for a will.

Trusts Third section 25(2) continues with the related and similarly
well established proposition 3 L that a trust that is "not
testamentary"-i.e., not literally created by will-"is not subject to
the formal requirements of section 17 (the Wills Act) or to
procedures for the administration of a decedent's estate."
Although representing an ongoing trend of authority, the rest of
section 25(2) presently lacks consistent support from state to
state.3 2 It continues by stating: "nevertheless, a revocable inter
vivos trust is ordinarily subject to substantive restrictions on

26.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 46(2) cmts. c-g; UNIF. TR. ACT

§ 402(b) (Draft 1998).
27.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §

47(1) (providing a different result for

the intention that failed in Morice); see also UNIF. TR. ACT § 406(a) (Draft 1998).
28.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47(2). Cf. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2907(b).
29.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25(1) cmts. a-c reporter's notes
(authorities collected).
30.
Id. § 25(2).
31.
See id.
32.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(2) cmts. d-e reporter's notes
(extensive collection and discussion of case and statutory authorities).
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testation 33 and to rules of construction 3 4 and other rules 3 s
applicable to testamentary dispositions, and in other respects the
property of such a trust is ordinarily treated as if it were owned
36
by the settlor."
E. Termination and Modification of Trusts
The modem trend in American law is to liberalize the rules
governing the termination and modification of trusts by
agreement of the beneficiary or by the exercise of judicial
authority. In most American states, there is no counterpart of
38
3
England's Variation of Trusts Act 1958; 7 nor does England
recognize a rule like the Claflin doctrine, discussed infra, that is
generally accepted throughout the United States.3 9
The law of most American states on termination and
modification by consent of the beneficiaries can be briefly and
reasonably well summarized. A trust may be prematurely
terminated or modified by the unanimous action of all
beneficiaries, provided that to do so will not interfere with a
"material purpose" of the settlor, unless the settlor is alive and
consents. 4° Two visible, but so far modest, tendencies in the
United States are as follows. First, there is a tendency to allow
some form of vicarious consent, by guardian ad litem4 l or virtual

33.
For example, spousal forced share and creditors' rights. On the latter,
see Estate of Nagel v. Rose, 520 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1998), recently joining cases
supporting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS position allowing creditors of a

deceased settlor's estate to reach assets in his/her previously revocable inter vivos
trust. Compare id., with Dunnewind v. Cook, 697 N.E.2d 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)
(finding "fraud on the widow's share"). But cf. Pezza v. Pezza, 690 A.2d 345 (R.I.
1997) (finding trust not "illusory").
34.
For example, pretermitted heir and anti-lapse statutes. See also
Wasserman v. Cohen, 606 N.E.2d 901 (Mass. 1993) (applying the doctrine of
ademption to a revocable trust).
35.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRuSTS § 25 illus. 11 (provisions in
revocable trust revoked by divorce under uils statute).
36.
See id. illus. 12 (on limits per "applicant" in statutes granting public
privileges or benefits); see also University Nat'l Bank v. Harsh, 833 P.2d 846 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding that homestead exemption was available for debtor's
residence held in his revocable trust).
37.
6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 53 (Eng.). Compare id, with Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 456.590.2 (1986).
38.
See Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, affd, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841).
39.
But see Hamerstrom v. Commerce Bank, 808 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991), decided under Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (1988).
40.

1989).
41.

See IV WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, ScOTr ON TRUSTS § 337-340.2 (4th ed.

See Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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representation, 42 to be given on behalf of unborn or
unascertainable beneficiaries. 43 Otherwise, the consent of all
beneficiaries could never be obtained in typical trusts, such as a
trust for X for life, remainder to X's issue living at her death. 44
The second tendency is an attempt to clarify,45 and perhaps to
provide some flexibility in,46 the material purpose Claflin47
qualification.
In the absence of beneficiary consent, the authority of courts
is very limited and can be simply stated with reasonable
accuracy. A court may authorize deviation from the

administrative terms of the trust if, by reason of changed
circumstances not contemplated by the settlor, adherence to
those terms would prevent or jeopardize fulfillment of trust
purposes. 48 Again, there is a modest or beginning trend toward
liberalization of this rule, as long as the settlor's objectives and
probable intentions are respected, because of two concerns: (1)
the standard involved, essentially one of emergency, may be
unnecessarily and undesirably demanding; 4 9 and (2) that
confining equitable deviation to administrative provisions may be

42.
Cf. Estate of Lange, 383 A.2d 1130 (N.J. 1978) (stating that consent of
parties in interest effectively exonerates executors from liability).
43.
See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-403; CAL. PROB. CODE § 15405 (West 1991)
(guardian ad litem may give consent based on "general family benefit"); see also
UNIF. TR. AcT § 408 (Draft 1998), 301-09; Eun C. Han, PrematureTermination of
Non-Spendthrift Trusts: Reconciing a Dead Settlor's Intent with a Living Beneficiary's
Needs, 3 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 191, 206-07 (1996).
44.
See, e.g., In re Lewis' Estate, 79 A. 921 (Pa. 1911); see also Levy v.
Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 14 Cal. App. 3d 102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (not allowing
termination despite request of settlor who held testamentary general power of
appointment over the interests of the unborn potential beneficiaries).
45.
See Rust v. Rust, 176 F.2d 66, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (distinguishing
"material purpose" from mere "intent").
46.
See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15403(b) (allowing for judicial discretion, in
effect, to waive settlor's material purpose); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337
cmt. f (1959) (merely providing for enjoyment by successive beneficiaries does not
constitute a material purpose that would prevent termination by consent); see
also UNIF. TR. Acr § 408(a) (Draft 1998) ("inclusion of a spendthrift provision...
not presumed to constitute a material purpose of the settlor").
47.
Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
48.
See IIA WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 167-167.2 (4th ed.

1987). Cf. id. § 168, 335-36. The standard is less severe when only division of a
trust is sought. Quick, easy "splitting" by a trustee without court authorization
became particularly important with the 1986 version of the generation-skipping
transfer tax. See I.R.C. ch. 13 (West 1989); see, e.g., BankBoston v. Marlow, 701
N.E.2d 304 (Mass. 1998); UNIF. TR. AcT § 413 (Draft 1998) (on combining and
dividing trusts).
49.
See, e.g., Bank of Delaware v. Clark, 249 A.2d 442 (Del. Ch. 1968)
(adopting more lenient "substitution of judgment approach"); see also UNIF. TR.
ACT § 409(a) (Draft 1998) (if deviation "will substantially further the settlor's
purposes in creating the trust").
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too narrow a restriction because the need to cure inadequate
foresight in drafting sometimes extends to distributive details.5 0
There is also some thought that it is sufficient that the
troublesome circumstances be "unanticipated" by the settlor,
even if the circumstances have not "changed."5 1
Modification of charitable trusts under the cy pres doctrine is
also a subject of some limited concern, 5 2 although it would be
overstating the case to say that significant developments have
occurred to date.5 3 Nevertheless, the doctrine has received some
attention in the development of a proposed Uniform Trust Act
that is likely to be promulgated soon by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for possible adoption in
the individual states; attention will also be given to a few
concerns as the American Law Institute's Trusts 3d project
proceeds. Experience suggests, however, that some clarification
would be useful with respect to how such traditional terms as
"impossible or impracticable"s 4 might be applied to the
increasingly frequent problem of trust funds that become
excessive for their stated charitable purposes. The term
"wastefu might be appropriate to describe the point at which
some of the trust's funds should cease to be expended for a
particular purpose and should be diverted cy pres to another,
even though the original purpose could in fact, readily if not
wisely, absorb more expenditures. 5 5 More fundamentally,
however, there is increased doubt about the need or duration of a
requirement that a "general charitable purpose"-.e., one
broader than the settlor's stated purpose(s)S6-be found in order
to apply cy pres rather than to have the property revert to the

See CAL. PROB. CODE § 15409(a) (West 1991) (applying to "dispositive"
50.
as well as administrative provisions). Cf. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (stating that
with consent a court may change the terms of a trust). See also UNIF. TR. ACT
§ 409(a) (Draft 1998) ("administrative or dispositive terms").
See UNIF. TR. ACT § 409(a) (Draft 1998) (analogizing this situation to
51.
liberalized mistake doctrine, discussed supranotes 20-22).
One of the articles expressing concern is Roger Sisson, Relaxing the
52.
Dead Hand's Grip: CharitableEfficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres,74 VA. L. REV.
635 (1988).
53.
But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501.12(3) (West 1991) (softening the initial

element of the doctrine to "impracticable, inexpedient, or impossible") (emphasis
added). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 701.10 (West 1981).
54.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 399-400 (1959).
55.
See the UNIF. TR. AcT § 414(a) (Draft 1998), which would add the word
"wasteful" to this initial requirement for the exdrcise of cy pres. The same word
can be expected to be used when the Trusts Third project reaches the matter.
56.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399; § 400 (on purposes
"fully accomplished without exhausting the trust property").
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successors in interest of a settlor who is probably long since

deceased.

57

F. Creditors and Spendthrift or DiscretionaryTrusts
Nearly all jurisdictions in the United States, unlike England,
permit voluntary and involuntary restraints on the alienation of
the interests of trust beneficiaries in at least some manner or
within some limits.5 8 Both the exceptions to and the inherent
limitations of spendthrift protections lead to the frequent use of
'protective" provisions5 9 of types that are apparently even more
common in England.6 0
It is fair to say that there is no foreseeable likelihood that the
basic policy of tolerating spendthrift restraints will change in this
country. There is, however, some continuing activity to modify or
fine-tune the specifics of spendthrift trust rules in the various
states, although one can hardly say that there is a recognizable
direction in this "stirring around."6 1 On the other hand, because
spendthrift protections do not validly apply to interests retained
by settlors, 62 various modern developments in the use and design

57.
See UNIF. TR. ACT § 414(a)(2) (Draft 1998), which would simply do away
with this requirement and with the possibility that the property might revert.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS is more likely to settle for an explicit presumption
against the resulting trust, with the presumption to be more difficult to rebut as
time passes, and to become conclusive after twenty-one years (by analogy to a
perpetuities period without measuring lives, even though reversionary interests
are not subject to the common law rule against perpetuities).

58.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. a reporter's notes.

59.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 57 & reporter's notes. The most
important of the "inherent limitations," under standard doctrine, is that
spendthrift protection ends upon distribution, when income or other funds are

distributed to a beneficiary. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. d.
60.
See Trustee Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, ch. 19, § 33 (Eng.), under which
"protective trusts" are regularly created simply by use of that expression.
61.
An almost amusing reversal of direction was the prompt 1998
legislation, MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-9-503 (1998), passed to overturn the widely
acclaimed Sligh v. FirstNat'! Bank, 704 So.2d 1020, 1027 (Miss. 1997), which had
introduced a policy-based spendthrift exception for the benefit of victims of a
beneficiary's gross negligence. Also, even lengthy and vigorous debates in the last
few years have eventually led to no significant changes or trends in rules
identifying privileged claimants who can penetrate the spendthrift shield. Compare
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59, With RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157
(1959); and UNIF. TR. ACT § 503, udth ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §§
331-76, at 387-462 (2d ed. 1947).
62.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. e.
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have required some elaboration and refinement of

rules about when a beneficiary is or may become a settlor.r 4

Much more needs to be done concerning the nature of
discretionary interests65 and their susceptibility to attachment by
creditors. Much of this need stems from the deficiencies of
traditional analyses based on an artificial distinction between
"discretionary" and "support" trusts,6 6 and from the overly
simplistic notion that beneficiaries of discretionary interests have
no enforceable rights, so that their creditors have nothing to
reach. 67 Gradually, the caselaw is exposing and beginning to
confront these generally fallacious ideas. 68 The current Trusts
69
Third project seeks to clarify and develop the law in this area,
including with respect to modem trusts in which beneficiaries
frequently serve as trustees or co-trustees or as holders of nonoften limited by fairly objective
fiduciary powers of withdrawal,
70
standards for tax reasons.
Some mention should be made of recent legislation in several
states to do away with the traditional rule71 allowing a settlor's
creditors to reach the maximum amount a settlor with a retained
discretionary interest might receive in the proper exercise of the
trustee's discretion. 72 Such legislation is unlikely to spread

63.

These developments have been primarily stimulated by tax planning,

with the widespread use of powers of appointment, withdrawal powers, and
beneficiaries as trustees or cotrustees.
64.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. f.
65.
See infra Part III.E.
66.
The positions of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 154-55 are
abandoned in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 60 cmt. a reporter's notes (providing criticism and explanation of the new
position); see also UNIF. TR.ACT§ 504 (Draft 1998).
67.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 cmt. b (1959). The supposed

lack of enforceable rights, however, is inconsistent with that Restatement's own
section 187 (on remedying abuse of discretion). See further discussion of abuse of
discretion infra Part III.E.
68.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 reporter's notes, § 60 cmt. e
reporter's notes.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 & cmts. b, c (on judicial review
69.
of trustees' exercise of discretion, and on the effects and limits of grants of
"absolute" discretion), cmt. d (on the meaning of standards commonly used by
settlors), cmt. e (on the significance of beneficiaries' other resources, including
others' duties of support and the relationship to the availability of need-based
public benefit programs, such as Medicaid), and cmt. f (on the rights and
presumptive priorities among multiple beneficiaries and classes as concurrent
beneficiaries).
70.
See id. § 60 cmt. g.
71.
See, e.g., Matter of Shurley, 115 F.3d 333, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1997);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

§ 60 cmt. f.
72.
See Blattmachr & Hompesch,
perpetuities features of these statutes).

supra note

17

(discussing

the
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much further, but one should not underestimate the business
protection or attraction incentives and lobbying effectiveness of
bankers associations as the perceived threat from offshore
havens is joined by a threat from new onshore competitors.
III. FIDUCIARY STANDARDS: TRUSTEES' DUTIES
AND BENEFICIARIES' RIGHTS

A. Some Aspects of the Trustee's Office
Traditional common law has required unanimity of action by
multiple trustees of private trusts, although the law of charitable
trusts has provided for majority rule when a charitable trust has
three or more trustees. The terms of private trusts often provide
for decision making by majority vote and a few statutes prescribe
majority control as the default rule. The Trusts Third project
states the majority-control rule as the preferred common law view
in the absence of a contrary provision in the terms of the trust.
The Uniform Trust Act will also provide for majority control as the
statutory default rule for private as well as charitable trusts. 73
There has been no sign of opposition from advisory groups for
these projects or form lawyers' or bankers' organizations.
The normal presumption is that trustees of both charitable
and private trusts in this country are entitled to compensation.
The widespread use of statutory fee schedules for executors and
administrators in this country has generally been supplanted by
a rule of "reasonable compensation." 74 The need and justification
for abandoning statutory schedules in favor of reasonable
compensation is even stronger in the case of trustees.7" The
Uniform Trust Act 7 6 and Trusts Third will reinforce the present
trend in this direction. 7 7 An accompanying trend recognizes that
courts have equitable authority to require departures from fee
schedules prescribed either by statutes or by trust instruments
when circumstances show those schedules to be distinctly
excessive or inadequate. 7 8 The need for greater flexibility and

73.
See UNIF. TR. AcT § 703(a)(1) (Draft 1998).
74.
This process was accelerated by the promulgation of the UNIF. PROB.
CODE (specifically § 3-719) in 1969.

75.
In California, for example, although CAL. PROB. CODE section 10800
(West 1991) still provides a statutory fee schedule for personal representatives,
section 15681 provides a "reasonable compensation" rule for trustees.
76.
See UNIF. TR. AcT § 709(a) (Draft 1998).
77.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 38.

78.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3560 (1995); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRuSTS § 38 cmts. c, e; UNIF. TR. AcT § 709(b) (Draft 1998). Cf. Andrews
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room for the exercise of sound discretion is also being recognized

in statutes, cases, and treatises with respect to the determination

of compensation entitlements of multiple trustees 79 and the
effects on fiduciary compensation of a trustee's employment of
advisers or agents.8 0 Arbitrary doctrine or statutory rules have
often impeded the exercise of common sense in these situations,
number of
and flexibility and guidance is offered by an increasing
81
modem statutes, cases, and treatise discussions.
B. TrustInvestment Law
Probably the most significant and pervasive influence on
fiduciary standards in this country in the last decade has been,
and into the future probably will be, the new "prudent investor
rule." It originated in a special, initial volume of the Trusts Third
project,8 2 approved by the American Law Institute in 1990, and
was soon codified in several states and then made into a Uniform
Act. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act was promulgated in 1994
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and is thereby recommended by N.C.C.U.S.L. for
codification in all states. The modernized rule has already been
enacted or otherwise recognized as law in more than half of the
American jurisdictions.
In earlier periods of the twentieth century, the so-called
"prudent man rule" gradually became the dominant rule of trust
investment law in the various states, generally displacing less
flexible approaches, such as "legal lists" of permissible
investments. The classic prudent man dictdim, subsequently
quoted or paraphrased in other cases and treatises, appeared in
Harvard College v. Amorn8 3 more than a century and a half ago.
More recently, with slight paraphrasing of that dictum, the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts instructed trustees "to make such
investments and only such investments as a prudent man would
make of his own property having in view the preservation of the
estate and the amount and regularity of the income to be

v. Gorby, 675 A.2d 449 (Conn. 1996) (an interesting case involving a trust drawn

by the fiduciary).
79.

See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oFTRusTs

§ 38 cmt. i.

80.
See, e.g., id. § 38 cmt. c, illus. 1.
See supra notes 76-78; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 38
81.
reporter's notes.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS still (temporarily) presents the main
82.
provisions of its Prudent Investor Rule in sections 227-29, but the content of the
volume, with its accompanying modifications of other sections of the prior
RESTATEMENT, will eventually be incorporated, renumbered, and relocated as the
comprehensive RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS project continues.

83.

26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).

1999]

SIGNIFICANT TRENDS N TRUST LAW

derived...." 8 4 This and earlier statements of general principles of
care, skill, and caution (collectively, "prudence") were developed,
applied, and elaborated in the caselaw. Generalizations were
articulated and efforts were made to provide guidance to trustees,
with the result that over time the prudent man rule lost much of its
generality and adaptability as applied in most states.
America's leading trust law scholar, the late Professor Austin
Scott, acknowledged that "what was decided in one case as a
question of fact tend[ed] to be treated as a precedent establishing
a rule of law,"8 5 although his own work contributed significantly
to this unfortunate tendency. 8 6 Thus, the tendency was "to lay
down definite subsidiary rules on what is and what is not a
prudent investment"8 7 and to treat a case disapproving a
particular investment by a trustee "as a precedent holding that
no investment of that type is proper."88 As a result, general
standards often became crystallized into doctrine prescribing,
with varying degrees of specificity and usually with some
recognition of the benefits of diversification, the permissible types

and characteristics of trust investments.

These were usually

based on some perceived but undefined degree of risk that
exceeded the limits of caution. With investments so classified
and judged in isolation, and with broad categories of assets or
courses of action branded as "speculative," trustees in surcharge
actions have found it difficult, if allowable at all, to show that a
particular investment or strategy falling outside the approved
categories was prudent in a particular case.
Knowledge, experience, and practices in the modem
investment world demonstrate that many prohibitions under the
traditional prudent man rule are unwarranted and likely to be
counterproductive, inhibiting the exercise of sound judgment by
skilled fiduciaries and creating risks of unjustified liability for all
trustees. Well-documented and generally compelling bodies of
theoretical and empirical research (including scholarship
recognized by a Nobel Prize in economics), as well as considerable
professional literature, support these criticisms of the traditional
prudent man rule.8 9

84.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959).
85.
3 AUSTINW. SCOTT,THE LAW OF'TRUSTS § 227, at 431 (2d ed. 1956).
86.
To that end, see id., as well as the first and second RESTATEMENTS OF
TRUSTS, for which Scott was the reporter. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §

227 (1959).
87.
88.

Il WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 227, at 434 (4th ed. 1988).
See id. at 435.

89.

See generally BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND

(1986); Harvey E. Bines, Modem Portfolio Theory and
Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 721
THE PRUDENT MAN RULE
(1976).
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Section 227 of Trusts Third: Prudent Investor Rule states the
"General Standard of Prudent Investment" as follows: "[t]he
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to invest and manage
the funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the
purposes,
terms,
distribution
requirements
and
other
circumstances of the trust." It continues:
[T]his standard requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill and
caution, and is to be applied to investments not in isolation but in
the context of the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall
investment strategy, which should incorporate risk and return
objectives reasonably suitable to the trust. 9 0

Section 227(b) imposes a forceful but nevertheless flexible
duty to diversify trust investments, while section 227(c) requires
compliance with the "fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and
impartiality" 9 ' and of prudence in delegation, 92 as well as
emphasizing the increasingly important duty of the trustee to be
cost-conscious
in
the
discharge
of trust
investment
responsibilities. These various principles are explained and
illustrated through almost one hundred pages of official
93
commentary and reporter's notes.
The traditional rule generally prohibiting the offsetting of
gains against losses from breaches of trusts is widely
misunderstood to hinder reliance on modem portfolio theory in
trust investment. Nevertheless, Trusts Third revisits this subject
and provides some fine-tuning for this so-called "no-netting rule."
More important is a change of direction in Trusts 3d calling for a
trustee's liability for improper investment conduct to be based on
a total return, positive or negative, measure of damages. 9 4 This
change would generally allow surcharge recoveries to reflect gains
and losses in value that reasonably should have been expected
from an appropriate investment program, rejecting the traditional
notion that such liability is necessarily too speculative. 95 The
new rule should ensure that trustees who have ignored important
aspects of their fiduciary obligations through inadequate
investment strategies will not be insulated from liability merely

90.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227.

91.
92.

See discussion of impartiality infraPart III.D.
See discussion of delegation infra Part III.C.

93.

See TRUSTS (THIRD): PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 (1992).

94.

See id. §§ 205, 208-11 (containing partial, preliminary modifications of

§§ 205, 208-11 of the prior RESTATEMENT).
95.
Why and how this modernized approach would be used is explained,
and relevant experience and authorities are cited, in id. reporter's notes at 16673. See also Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third

Restatement, 27 REAL PROP., PROB. &TR. J. 407, 458-62 (1992). This approach was
recently adopted, correctly and with no apparent difficulty, in Estate of Wide, 708
A.2d 273, 276 (Me. 1998).
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because their investment programs have escaped loss of dollar
value during periods of significantly rising markets.
A fundamental premise of the prudent investor rule is that
no investment or course of action is per se impermissible. 96
Counterparts of this principle can be expected to apply
pervasively to matters of trust administration and to appear
throughout the administration chapters of Trusts Third.
Traditional questions about whether a trustee possesses
particular powers will be replaced by a recognition that, absent a
contrary trust provision, a trustee has all the powers of other
property owners but with a duty of prudent exercise. The
prudence of a trustee's conduct in a particular case thus will be
judged in full context, in light of the terms, purposes, and other
circumstances of the trust as well as the trustee's general
fiduciary duties.
C. Delegation

Illustrative of the foregoing observation is the default rule
concerning a trustee's authority to delegate. The trust law of the
future will not ask whether or for what purposes the power exists,
but will simply focus on the circumstances and manner of its
exercise. In the last decade, the law's negative attitude toward
delegation by trustees has been substantially reversed.
Traditionally, absent a contrary trust provision, cases and
treatises have grudgingly accepted delegation on a narrowly
confined basis. Prior Restatements have allowed it only for
"ministerial" acts or to the extent that the trustee has no
reasonable alternative, 97 and they have specifically
forbidden
98
delegation of the "power to select investments."
The prudent investor rule of Trusts Third requires only that a
trustee "act with prudence in deciding whether and how to
delegate authority and in the selection and supervision of
agents."99 In official commentary on investment activities, Trusts
Third observes that "the trustee has power, and may sometimes
have a duty, to delegate such functions and in such manner as a
96.

See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(e), 7B U.L.A. 61 (Supp. 1998), and

accompanying

comments

(especially

"[a]brogating

categoric

restrictions");

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE, at 5 (1992) (explaining

"[p]rinciples of prudence" in the Introduction). On the extension of such a
principle to administrative powers generally, see Trusts of Land and Appointment
of Trustees Act, 1996, § 6(1) (Eng.).
97.

98.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959).

See id. cmt. h.
99.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227(c)(2)
(1992). See generallyJohn H. Langbein, Reversing the NondelegationRule of TrustInvestment Law, 59 Mo. L. REV. 105 (1994).
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prudent investor would delegate under the circumstances."10 0
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act offers a codification of the rule
of Trusts Third with respect to investment "and management"
functions, 10 1 and expressly provides that a trustee who complies
with the requirements of proper delegation 1 0 2 "is not liable to the
beneficiaries or to the trust for the decisions or actions of the
agent to whom the function was delegated."1 0 3
D. Duty of Impartiality
Trust law has long recognized the trustee' duty of
impartiality and the companion duty to make the trust estate
reasonably "productive"-i.e., of trust accounting income-for the
benefit of income beneficiaries. These duties obligate the trustee
to balance the competing objectives and concerns associated with
the diverse beneficial interests in typical private trusts.
Counterparts to these issues exist in charitable trusts, in which
productivity is a concern whenever (as in typical institutional
endowments) "income" is to be expended, or whenever the
interests of the "present" must be balanced against the interests
10 4
of the "future."

100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt. j
(1992). An appendix to this volume partially and preliminarily amends the rule of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS section 171 (on delegation generally) to state: "A
trustee has a duty personally to perform the responsibilities of the trusteeship
except as a prudent person might delegate those responsibilities to others,"
adding that in "deciding whether, to whom and in what manner to delegate

fiduciary authority in the administration of a trust, and thereafter in supervising
agents, the trustee is under a duty ... to exercise fiduciary discretion and to act
as a prudent person would act in similar circumstances." Id. app. § 171. Amended
Comment f of that appendix section adds:
Delegation is not limited to the performance of ministerial acts. In
appropriate circumstances delegation may extend, for example, to
discretionary acts, to the selection of trust investments or the
management of specialized investment programs, and to other
activities of administration involving significant judgment .... The
trustee's exercise of this discretionary authority is judicially
reviewable only for abuse, based on failure to exercise the required
degree of care, skill, or caution.
101. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTORACr § 9(a), 7B U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 1998).
102. See id. § 9(a)(1)-(3) (requiring prudence in selecting an agent, in
establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, and in monitoring the agent's
performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation).

103.

Id. § 9(c).

104. The UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT, 7A U.L.A. 475
(1999), attempts, reasonably successfully, to address concerns of this type, mainly
with respect to investment and distributions.
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The most important trend in these matters is a growing
professional understanding, or at least awareness, of the subtle
issues inherent in the duty of impartiality and in the duty with
respect to productivity. Unfortunately, the true nature and
implications of the duty of impartiality have been little explained,
and vaguely defined at best, in the cases and literature. This is
true even in the Internal Revenue Service's hazy insistence upon
a normal, state law degree of "productivity" in trusts that are
intended to qualify for such privileges as the marital deduction
and the gift tax annual exclusion.10 5
The prudent investor rule of Trusts Third includes a
comprehensive but flexible duty of impartiality and seeks to
clarify and in some respects to broaden the contents of the duty,
or at least to create sensitivity to the breadth of its potential
application.10 6 The rule also identifies trust situations in which
10 7
the "productivity" feature of this duty has little or no relevance.
In addition, the commentary makes clear that a trustee's
productivity concerns relate to the trust portfolio as a whole,
08
rather than to each individual investment.1
The Trusts Third prudent investor rule also attempts to make
clear that impartiality does not require an equal balancing of
diverse interests, which may involve not only the obvious
conflicting interests of income and remainder beneficiaries, but
also the conflicting needs and objectives of multiple income
beneficiaries or of multiple remainder beneficiaries.' 0 9 Rather,
this duty calls for the balancing of interests in a manner
consistent with the terms and purposes of the trust, including a
settlor's ascertainable or inferred preferences for some
beneficiaries over others, such as.the priority frequently intended
for a surviving spouse over descendants or other future interest
holders. Essentially, the duty of impartiality ordinarily forbids a
trustee from injecting its own "substantive" favoritism in making
discretionary distributions or investment decisions and, in
"procedural" matters, from consulting with or providing
information to the life beneficiary to the exclusion of persons
interested in the remainder. Thus, the concerns and wishes and

105. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2503 (1994).
106. The author has explained this in his article, as well as in Trusts
(Third)'s Prudent Investor Rule volume. See Halbach, Trust Investment Law, supra
note 95; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt. i,

cmt. c (1992) & app. §§ 181, 183, and especially 232; see also id. §§ 239, 240.
107.' This is the case with respect to wholly discretionary trusts, annuity or
unitrust arrangements, and, to a lesser degree, trusts with flexible powers to
invade principal.
108.

i (1992).
109.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt.

See id. § 227, cmt. i & app. § 232.
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the personal, financial, and tax circumstances of the various
beneficiaries are all to be taken into account in a manner
consistent with the terms and purposes of the particular trust.

Finally, Trusts Third makes clear that a trustee must take
account of the risks inflation might pose to purchasing power and
real values, again in a manner and to an extent consistent with
the nature and objectives of the particular trust.1 1 0
The prudent investor rule's emphasis on strategies and
objectives that are consistent with the purposes of each
individual trust and on portfolio theory and the benefits of
investing for total return1 1 1 has stimulated trust practitioners'
interest in understanding finance. 1 12 Some particularly useful
materials for the foreseeable future will be the recent professional
writings concerning the importance of and techniques for
avoiding conflicts between productivity requirements and optimal
total-return investment objectives through creative trust design,
often emphasizing unitrust life interests, 113 and through revision
of statutes governing trust principal and income accounting to
include some form of special adjustment power. 114

110. Id.; see also § 227 cmt. c and especially cmt. e.
111. Essentially, income yield plus increase in corpus value.
112. Grants from the The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel
Foundation have resulted in a valuable, concise text for a lawyer audience,
already in its second edition. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN
FINANCIAL THEORY (2d ed. 1998); see also Burton G. Malldel, An Update on Modem
Financal Theory, 24 ACTEC NOTES 127 (1998) (ACTEC's 1998 Joseph Trachtman
Lecture).

113.

An opening piece in the growing "dialogue" was Robert B. Wolf,

Defeating the Duty to DisappointEqually-The Total Return Trust 23 ACTEC Notes
46 (1997). Then came William L. Hoisington, Modem Trust Design: New Paradigms
for the 21st Century, 31 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 6,
600-10) (1997); Joel
C. Dobris, Why Trustee Investors Often Prefer Dividends to Capital Gain and Debt
Investments to Equity-A Daunting Principal and Income Problem, 32 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TR. J. 255 (1997); Robert B. Wolf, Total Return Trust-Can Your Clients
Afford Anything Less?, 33 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 131 (1998); and Jerold I.
Horn, Prudent Investor Rule, Modem Portfolio Theory, and Private Trusts: Drafting
andAdministrationIncludingthe "Give-Me-Five" Unitrust, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 1 (1998). On charitable trusts, see Stanley Lebergott, Nonprofits Should Rethink
Investment Strategies,Public Affairs Report (U. of Calif., Sept. 1996).
114. See the power of the recently promulgated UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME
ACT § 506 (revised 1997), 7B U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1998), which has not only
stimulated legislative and law reform commission interest in developing other
alternatives for adjustment, but also consideration of a default rule that would
attribute a unitrust construction to a grant of a right to "income" (the likely
outcome of current deliberations in New York).
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E. JudicialReview of Discretion
The use of trust powers and the discharge of trusteeship

responsibilities

regularly involve the exercise of fiduciary

judgment, or discretion, with which courts generally do not
interfere except to prevent abuse or the misinterpretation of trust
115
provisions.
The growing use and variety of discretionary trusts--or more
properly, trusts that grant the trustee discretion with respect to
some or all of the distributions that one or more of the
beneficiaries are to receive---give rise to increasingly common and
increasingly diverse issues about discretionary powers and
benefits. Discretion may relate to invasion of principal for an
income beneficiary, distributions of income or principal to or for
the benefit of either a primary beneficiary or a secondary (or lower
priority) beneficiary, or distributions that are to be sprinkled
among a class of beneficiaries, such as the settlor's surviving
spouse and descendants. Judicial decisions, practitioners, and
authors of articles and treatises increasingly recognize and
attempt to respond to the need to provide guidance to trustees,
beneficiaries, and judges.
Issues addressed in recent years include: the presumed
construction of recurring standards (for example, "support) or1 of
16
discretionary powers in the absence of express standards;
whether and in what manner a trustee is to take account of a
beneficiary's other resources that could be used for the settlor's
intended purpose(s); 117 the extent to which the trustee's discretion,
judicial supervision, and the beneficiaries' rights of enforcement
are affected by the settlor's use of such language as "sole and
uncontrolled" or "absolute" discretion; 118 and how all of this
applies, including the priority and impartiality-related preferences
to be attributed to settlors, when a discretionary power is for
1 19
multiple individuals or classes as concurrent beneficiaries.
Statutes and decisions increasingly make clear that language such
as "absolute" and the like in a grant of discretion, or a provision
under which the trustee is to determine whether a particular

beneficiary is to receive anything, is not to be taken literally; such
language does not dispense with the trustee's normal duty to act in

115.
II WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCorr ON TRUSTS §§ 128-128.7 (4th ed. 1987).
116.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmts. b, d.
117.
See id. cmt. e. Also considered in this comment are such matters as
another's duty to support the beneficiary and, of growing importance, the
potential availability of need-based public benefit programs.
118.
See id. cmt. c.
119.
See id. cmt. f.
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good faith and in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes
120
of the discretionary power.
F. Duty with Respect'to Accounting and Disclosure
A trustee's duty to provide information to beneficiaries on a
reasonable basis has long been recognized.12 1 Nevertheless,
practice, experience, and litigation in the United States clearly
demonstrate that there is considerable reluctance, and at least a
fair amount of uncertainty, among fiduciaries concerning the
applicability and performance of this general duty. It is well
recognized that principles of accountability and disclosure do not
apply to donees (holders) of powers of appointment, the exercise
of which may be arbitrary and need not be justified or explained
as long as the scope of the power is not exceeded. 122 It is not so
clear, however, to whom the trustee's duties run when a trust
contains powers of appointment; but it would seem clear enough
that potential takers in default (although probably not other
objects of an unexercised power) are "beneficiaries" and as such
are entitled to notices and information, and that the donee of a
23
power should also be so viewed.'
Some duty to account is fundamental to the fiduciary
relationship. This, however, has not and should not be taken to
mean that the terms of a trust cannot narrow, lower, or otherwise
alter the duty to render accountings, particularly routine or formal
accountings.' 24 On the other hand, the increased emphasis on the
accepted principle that trusts are for the benefit of the beneficiaries
has led in recent years to increased emphasis on and clarification of
the rights of beneficiaries to obtain information and copies of trust
provisions, 125 except to the extent the trust is subject to revocation
by a legally competent setflors.12 6 Some recent legislation has been
so strong in recognizing and perhaps expanding the rights of
beneficiaries that protests have been heard from some members of

120. See, e.g., id. cmt. c reporter's notes (containing an extensive collection
and discussion of authorities); see also UNIF. TR. ACT § 815 (Draft 1998). For a
more general provision on discretion, see section 801 of the Uniform Trust Act.
121. See, e.g., GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRuSTs §§ 140-42 (6th ed. 1987).
122. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. a. As that comment
notes, however, it is not always easy to draw a line between fiduciary and nonfiduciary powers. See id.
123. See definition of "beneficiary" in UNIF. TR. ACT § 105(1) (Draft 1998).
124. See id. § 142; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 172 cmt. b, 173 cmt.
c (1959).
125. See UNIF. TR. ACT § 814 (Draft 1998).
126.
See, e.g., id. § 814(Q.
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the Bar, 127 particularly those whose practice includes
representation of trustees but also some concerned about the
wishes of client-settlors. Nevertheless, the trend of legislation and
judicial decisions likely will continue to favor increased openness
and disclosure in most situations involving irrevocable trusts, even
8
discretionary trusts.12
A popular, related development is the adoption or
recommendation of statutes that authorize and facilitate informal
accountings, and that authorize and simplify certain other
actions out of court. Some recent legislative efforts of this type
raise significant due process issues, but sound models for
legislation (and guides even for parties wishing to proceed
without specific statutory blessing) have been formulated in the
29
last several years. 1
G. Trust Protectors
An important recent development in trust and estate
planning practice, especially in connection with offshore trusts,
has been the use of trust "protectors." The protector may be one
of several trustees or a beneficiary, but often is neither, and may
have extensive authority or a narrowly defined power to change
trustees or the situs of administration. Some protectors with
broader authority are granted powers to clarify or modify trust
terms for purposes such as: qualifying for or accomplishing some
specific tax or non-tax objective(s); improving administration or
otherwise promoting the settlor's general purposes or the
beneficiaries' best interests; or even adding or eliminating
beneficiaries or rearranging their rights.
The diverse types of protectors and the sheer variety of their
uses and powers create serious difficulties in attempting to
generalize about the nature of the protector's role and obligations.
Under what circumstances and to what extent is a trust protector
a fiduciary? Might some powers of some protectors be more like
powers of appointment, perhaps even exercisable for the
protector's personal or family benefit, with little accountability to
others? There are also choice of law and even jurisdictional

127.

This has been true with respect to CAL. PROB. CODE sections 16061,

16061.5, 16061.7 (West. 1991).
128.
See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. b (stating that
discretionary beneficiaries are entitled "not only to accounting information but

also to relevant information concerning the bases upon which the trustee's
discretionary judgments have been or will be made").
129. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-403, 8 U.L.A. 69 (1998); see also UNIF. TR.
Acr art. 3, §§ 301-09 (Draft 1998).
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issues to be explored, often in relatively novel circumstances.1 3 0
Unfortunately, trust law in the United States shows virtually no
appellate experience with the protector concept or other legal
development of it.
The present void in American trust doctrine aggravates the
difficulty of interpretation and the issues of fiduciary
responsibility that are an inevitable result of the novelty and
diversity of trust protector provisions-not to mention the risk of
unanticipated, adverse tax consequences. This uncertainty
creates an immense challenge for American estate planners, who
may find it helpful to look to England or elsewhere for legal
developments or professional guidance on trust design and

drafting.

One might reasonably speculate that in the United

States, absent some clear indication of contrary intent, the
powers granted to a protector will be deemed to be held in a

fiduciary capacity, even if not that of trustee,1 3 1 with considerable
breadth of freedom to act in the collective best interests of the
beneficiaries, in good faith, with a general duty of impartiality,
and in a manner consistent with the settlor's purposes in creating
the trust and the office of trust protector. One might further
speculate that, presumptively at least, it would be appropriate to
treat a trust protector who has broad, "sole and uncontrolled,"
and "binding" discretion essentially as the trust law would treat a
trustee with such an "absolute" discretion.13 2

IV. CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion has not attempted to review all
recent developments in American trust law. It does, however,
reflect the author's perceptions of current and continuing trends
that are significant to trust and estate planning lawyers in the
United States and of interest to comparative and international
law scholars and practitioners elsewhere.

130. A somewhat analogous problem arose in a recent case, District of
Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539 (D.C. App. 1997), which held
that continuing contact between a D.C. domiciliary's testamentary trust and D.C.
courts sufficed to satisfy the due process requirement of a significant link between
the District and the trust to allow it to be treated by the District as a resident for
income tax purposes.
131. Cf. UNIF. TR. AcT § 809 (Draft 1998) (concerning powers granted to

others to direct trustees).
132. See supra Part ILI.E; notes 118, 120 and accompanying text; see also
Antony Duckworth, Protectors-FishorFowl? Part1, 5 J. op INT'L TR. & CORP. PLAN.
18, 18-19 (1996) ("Administrative Powers-Purpose Restrictions"). But cf. UNIF.
TR. ACT § 815 cmt. (Draft 1998) (explaining that the section applies only to powers
held in a fiduciary capacity).

